经济与社会科学2022nber.org
拥有 MBA 的管理者最擅长从工人身上取钱，别的就不太行了
Managers with MBAs are the best at taking money from workers and not much else
进阶 · 约 60 分钟读完前置知识：计量经济学基础、劳动经济学、公司金融基础
导读
这篇 NBER 工作论文考察拥有 MBA 背景的管理者究竟为企业带来什么：是提升经营效率，还是更善于在劳资分配中为资本方争取更大份额。讨论中的核心结论是，MBA 管理者在压低员工薪酬/劳动收入份额方面表现突出，而在其他经营绩效上优势不明显；具体识别策略和因果强度需以原文为准。
HN 关注点：对 MBA 管理文化的批评：管理者把复杂业务简化为财务指标，压低劳动成本、服务短期股东回报，而非提升长期经营能力。
HN 评论精选
这几条评论里：支持 1 质疑 1 补充 1
支持批评 MBA 式管理者把不懂的业务简化为财务数字，造成资产剥离等短期主义后果，并建议延迟发放奖金以约束管理者。
我常注意到“商业管理者”（MBA 或想当管理者的人）的一个趋势：他们假定自己能管理自己并不理解的东西，然后直接把问题简化成最低共同标准——美元和美分（或你当地的货币）。他们并不真正管理业务，而是要求别人想办法减少成本项上的金额、提高利润或收入项上的金额。结果往往可预见，也符合这里大多数评论：短期思维后果，比如资产剥离、卖掉东西释放（并不需要的）资本再租回来（在支付大笔股息后烧掉资本堆，让企业看起来更赚钱，实际上螺旋下坠）等。我想知道，除了老套的“股东价值”或“股东回报”，这种做法还有没有站得住脚的理由？这是被教导或作为信条预期的吗？“把你不理解的复杂事物变成收入”是教授的原理吗？（按我的经验，这会导致非常明显的灾难性问题，因为管理者不理解或不相信其改动会带来什么影响，然后在可预见的负面结果到来前跳槽。）公司是否可以通过分多年发放奖金、把管理者真实业绩能力纳入考量，来获得更好的管理者？也就是……
g_p查看英文原文
A trend I've noticed often among "business managers" (MBAs or wannabes) is to assume they can manage something they don't understand, then simply shift to the lowest common denominator of dollars and cents (or your local equivalent). Rather than actually manage anything, they then just demand others find ways to reduce the number of dollars in the cost line, and raise the number of dollars in the profit or revenue line. The end result tends to be foreseeable and in line with most other comments here - short-term thinking outcomes, like asset stripping, selling things to free up capital (that isn't needed) and leasing them back (to make the business look more profitable as it spirals into the ground by burning up all that capital pile, after paying a large dividend), etc. I wonder - is there an argument in favor of this, beyond the usual "shareholder value" or "shareholder return"? Is this something that's taught or expected as part of the doctrine? Is the idea of turning complex things you don't understand into revenue a taught principle? (As in my experience, it ends up with very obvious catastrophic issues, caused by the business manager not understanding or believing the impact that will arise from the change they make, followed by them changing job before the foreseen and inevitable negative outcome arrives). Could companies get better business managers by releasing their bonus over a period of years, so that people's true ability to perform is factored in? Aka the principle of being around for long enough to get found out, which in theory ought to get you better managers, since those who would get "found out" will avoid the opportunity?
补充补充早前媒体对 MBA 管理文化的批评，并给出“平庸但傲慢”等贬称。
这是几年前的资料，但与当前话题相关。ABC 节目称：MBA：多半很糟糕。几十年前管理文化出了某种问题，如今拥有 MBA 学位、尤其是哈佛 MBA，反而有点臭名昭著。MBA 也被戏称为“Mediocre but Arrogant”（平庸但傲慢）或“Management by Accident”（意外管理）。
conz查看英文原文
From a few years ago, but pertinent to the topic at hand. MBA: Mostly bloody awful Something happened to management culture decades ago and now being a Master of Business Administration, especially from Harvard, is rather on the nose. MBA, it's being said, can also stand for 'Mediocre but Arrogant', or 'Management by Accident'. https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/mba-mostly-bloody-awful/3143174
质疑认为核心问题是短期主义与激励结构，季度考核和外部明星高管循环造成“拉高后套现走人”。
嘲笑 MBA 虽然活该，但感觉偏离了核心问题：短期主义。美国几乎所有企业的激励都围绕季度/年度结果，上市公司甚至几乎在法律上必须如此。这催生了一类“进来、拉高、套现走人”的管理者。通过长期员工内部提拔本应被视为价值信号，但职业交易者更偏好外部聘用，因为其过往记录公开、更容易量化。这造成少数 CTO 级别的高管在企业间不停轮转，收入越来越离谱，常常留下烂摊子。
Someone1234查看英文原文
Dunking on MBAs, while deserved, feels like a distraction to the core problem: Short-termism. Incentives in almost all US businesses are based around quarterly/annual outcomes, and even more so are almost legally required to for public companies. This results in a breed of manager who wants to get in, pump, and dump. Hiring from a within via long term employees should be seen as a value signal, but instead professional traders prefer external hires because their track-record is public, and can be more easily quantified. This creates a small number of CTO-tier hires who rotate endlessly through corporate entities making ever more obscene incomes, and often leaving a mess behind them.
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