经济与社会科学2019papers.ssrn.com
谁拥有华为？
Who Owns Huawei?
入门 · 约 45 分钟读完前置知识：公司治理基础、中国政治经济体制常识
导读
这篇论文考察华为的股权与所有权结构，试图通过公开记录厘清这家公司究竟由谁拥有、股东与关联实体如何构成。它关注的不是单纯的工商登记，而是所有权安排能否反映实际控制权，以及国家资本与民营企业边界在华为案例中的模糊性。
HN 关注点：与其追问法律意义上的“谁拥有华为”，不如追问谁在实际上控制它，以及中国政企关系为何让西方式所有权分析失效。
HN 评论精选
这几条评论里：支持 2 补充 1 亲历 1
支持中国通过“融合中心”等机制把国家情报能力嵌入产业，所谓自由市场中的中国企业与国家并非分离。
中国还有一种国家称为“融合中心”的做法，是中国情报-工业复合体中最有意思的一面。大致是：国家决定要投资某个领域，比如用于储存可再生能源的高端前沿电池；然后把几家有能力或有意愿的公司集中到一栋楼里。国家代表实际上会问“我们需要知道什么”和“这个领域的主要玩家是谁”。大约一个月后他们再回来，向楼里所有公司做大型闭门演示。突然之间，该领域所有中国公司开始交付研发成果，最终产品达到该领域一些最顶尖水平。你几乎可以说他们学会了复制。怎么做到的？本质上是工业间谍活动，并建立一套工业和情报基础设施，让国家情报机器对国民经济产生最大影响。某种程度上这很聪明。我听到一位 NSA 分析员在一个很有意思的演讲中描述过这件事，我觉得非常吸引人，也正好回应你的观点。所谓我们是在和“自由市场”的中国公司竞争，这个想法是我们自己编造出来的虚构；中国不是这样运作的。公平地说，这对他们一直非常奏效。
sprafa查看英文原文
There’s also something the Chinese state calls “fusion centres” which is one of the most interesting facets of this intelligence-industrial complex in China. Essentially the state decides, let’s say high tech cutting edge batteries for storing renewable energy is where they want to invest in. They gather a few companies into a building that can do it or are interested. They then have state representatives who effectively ask “what do we need to know” and “who are the major players in the field. In a month or so they come back again. They do big closed door presentation for all the companies in the building. Suddenly all the Chinese companies in the space start delivering R&D and eventually products that match some of the best stuff being done in the space. You could almost say they’ve learnt to copy it.. How do they do it? Industrial espionage, essentially, and building an industrial and intelligence infrastructure that allows for maximum impact of the state’s intelligence apparatus into the national economy. In a way it’s kind of brilliant. I heard it described by an NSA analyst in a very interesting talk. I thought it was fascinating and speaks exactly to your point. The idea that we are competing with “free market” Chinese companies is a fiction that we’ve made up in our own minds. It’s just not how China works. And to be fair it’s been working gang busters for them. edit since someone asked for it, here’s the talk - https://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2017/04/fusion-centers.html?m=0 My description was from memory so I hope I remembered it right.
支持中国的国家、军队与企业并非西方式分立实体，企业更像国家治理和战略工具，华为不应被当作普通市场竞争者看待。
我听过的最有信息量的关于中国商业的评论是：必须把西方关于国家、军队、公司的概念扔出窗外。本质上，在中国这些都是同一个实体的不同描述性功能，任何表面上的分离都只是表面现象。我知道有人会回复说，比如洛克希德实际上也处在这种 nexus 中。这个论点很好，安排上可能相似但不完全相同。对我来说，最有趣的差别是，中国与其主要企业保持这种关系不分行业，不只限于国防承包商。所以无论你做手机、电子游戏、马桶座、船体还是混凝土，企业不依赖国家而存在这个概念在那里根本行不通。无论是通过跟党官员的后渠道，还是通过像本文这样的所有权安排，那里的公私部门概念都模糊到几乎毫无意义。对我来说，这比我们通常读到的东西更能说明知识产权侵权和间谍活动，因为西方喜欢把公司想象成在市场里竞争，而在中国，把公司描述为国家治理的工具更有用。华为想让我们认为它在跟苹果竞争，因为两家都做手机。现实中，这更像是 CIA 或 Mossad 在跟苹果竞争——各自的目标实际上可能彼此正交……
ordinaryradical查看英文原文
The most informative comment I’ve heard about Chinese business is that one needs to take the western conception of state / military / corporation and chuck them out the window. In essence these are all descriptive functions of the same entity in China, and any apparent separation is just that—apparent. I know some may reply that, for example, Lockheed effectively lives at this nexus also. It’s a good argument, and probably similar though not exactly the same in arrangement. To me, the most interesting difference is that China has this kind of relationship with its major players regardless of industry, not just their defense contractors. So it doesn’t matter if you make cell phones, video games, toilet seats, ship hulls, or concrete—the whole concept of an enterprise not being interdependent on the state is a non-starter there. Whether it’s happening via backchannels to party officials or through ownership schemes like this one, the concept of private and public sector is so muddy there as to be almost meaningless. To me, this tells us a lot more about IP infringement and espionage than what we usually read, because where the west likes to conceive of corporations as competing in a market in China it’s more useful to describe corporations as tools of statecraft. Huawei wants us to think of them as competing with Apple because they both make cellphones. In reality, it’s as though the CIA or Mossad was competing with Apple—the aims of each may in fact be orthogonal to each other because market performance is not the real driver of the company’s decisions.
亲历亲历表明关键不是法律所有权而是党对企业的实际控制，党官员可直接干预公司决策。
跟中国打交道时，我们一如既往地关注错误的问题、问错误的问题。谁拥有华为并不重要，谁最终控制华为才是问题，而答案很简单：中国政府。我曾在中国出差，会见中国最大、最成功的科技公司之一，跟董事长/CEO 及其团队开会。所有人都被介绍了，只有一个人没有；大家 basically 当他不存在。他只是坐着听，直到听到不喜欢的内容，就迅速接管会议，训斥 CEO，并坚持要我们按他说的做。会议余下时间，CEO 和团队都低着头对着会议桌，显然都很害怕。会议关键部分定下后，这人起身离开，会议很快结束。我试图让中国同事解释发生了什么，但大家都搪塞过去。几天后我们到台湾，我才知道完整故事。那人是指导这家公司的党官员，确保中国政府的利益得到遵循。这就是中国，用西方的方式思考这些东西是愚蠢的。一切归政府所有。
watertom查看英文原文
As usual with China we are focused on the wrong issue and asking the wrong questions. Who owns Huawei is irrelevant, who ultimately controls Huawei is the issue, but it’s a simple answer, the Chinese Government. I was in China on business, we were meeting the one of the largest and most successful tech companies in China. We were meeting with the Chairman/CEO and his team. Everyone was introduced except one man, everyone basically acted like the guy wasn’t in the room. He just sat and listened until he heard something he didn’t like, he quickly took over the meeting, admonished the CEO, and insisted they we do as he said. For the remainder of the meeting the CEO and his team sat head facing the conference table, it was clear they were all terrified. Once the key parts of the meeting were decided this man got up and left, the meeting quickly ended. I tried to get my Chinese colleagues to explain what happened, but everyone just blew me off. A couple days later we were in Taiwan, and I got the full story. The man was the party official who guided the company. The guy made sure that the Chinese government’s interests were followed. It’s China, thinking about things like it’s the West is stupid. Everything is owned by the government.
补充威权体制下法律上的所有权只是近似，真正应看利润分配与实际权力，而实际权力始终受执政党约束。
在非民主国家，所有权并不意味着同样的东西。法律和公司注册规则总是对现实执行情况的一种近似，而在威权国家更是如此。真正的问题是利润分配和实际权力，也就是影响变革的能力。后者无论公司注册规则怎么写、无论利润分配如何，总是受执政党约束。苏联卫星国也是如此，只不过苏联国家对利润分配更严厉（共产主义）。
H8crilA查看英文原文
Ownership does not mean the same thing in non democratic states. The law and incorporation rules are always an approximation of what's applied in reality, but it is much more so in authoritarian states. The real two questions are those of profit distribution and actual power, as in the ability to effect change. The latter is always constrained by the ruling party, no matter what the incorporation rules say, and no matter what the former (distribution of profits) is. It was the case in Soviet satellite countries too, except Soviet states were also harsher on profit distribution (communism).
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