安全与密码学2021scss.tcd.ie
Android 手机在无退出选项下发送大量用户数据
Android phones are sending significant amount of user data with no opt-out
入门 · 约 45 分钟读完前置知识：Android 系统基础、网络流量分析基础
导读
都柏林圣三一学院 Doug Leith 的报告测量了 Android 手机（包括 Google、Samsung、Xiaomi 等品牌及 LineageOS 等第三方系统）向厂商发送遥测数据的情况，发现即使不主动使用，手机也会持续回传大量用户数据，且用户没有真正的退出选项。报告还指出小米设备会回传应用截图等敏感信息。
HN 关注点：HN 读者长期关注移动隐私，讨论焦点是各系统/ROM 实际回传了什么数据，以及不用 Google 服务能否真正保护隐私。
HN 评论精选
这几条评论里：支持 1 补充 2 亲历 1
补充澄清 LineageOS 传数据的是可选的 OpenGapps，而非系统本身，并推荐 MicroG 替代方案
需要澄清研究中 LineageOS 向 Google 传数据的部分：测试用的是 Pixel 2 上的 LineageOS 17.1，且安装了 OpenGapps 10.0 nano。传数据的是 OpenGapps（即 Google Play），而不是 LineageOS 本身。OpenGapps 是可选安装的，用户完全可以不装它，改用 F-droid 或 Aurora Store。另外还有 MicroG 这个替代品，允许用户匿名化使用 Google 服务，MicroG 官网提供内置它的 LineageOS 定制版（不过支持的设备较少）。
doc_gunthrop查看英文原文
A distinction needs to be made clear here with regards to the data being transmitted to Google by LineageOS in this study. In the cited paper (https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/Android_privacy_report.pdf), the device used to test LineageOS was a Google Pixel 2 running LineageOS 17.1 which also included an installation of OpenGapps 10.0 nano. It's not the OS that is transmitting the data over to Google, but rather OpenGapps (ie. Google Play). OpenGapps is software that can be optionally installed after the initial installation of LineageOS (but before first boot). A user can still use LineageOS without OpenGapps, though they just won't have the benefits (and drawbacks) that come with it (such as being able to use apps that require GSF). The user can instead opt for an app manager like F-droid or possibly Aurora Store. In addition, there exists an alternative to OpenGapps called MicroG. This is like Google Play but allows users the option to anonymize themselves. One can find custom LineageOS builds that include MicroG from the MicroG website (as the members of the LineageOS project do not advocate for its use, instead giving preference to OpenGapps). Keep in mind, however, that there are fewer devices supported by those builds.
亲历亲历分享：无 Google 服务的 ROM 配合 FOSS 应用完全可以日常使用
我用 GrapheneOS 和不带 Google Play 服务的 LineageOS，体验很好：OsmAnd 离线地图、Signal/Discord 通讯、NewPipe 看 YouTube、F-droid 装应用、APKmirror 补充少数闭源应用、Firefox/Vanadium 浏览器、K9 Mail 邮件等，几乎所有需求都有 FOSS 应用覆盖。二手 Pixel 3a 约 80 美元，各方面体验不输 iOS。唯一限制是推送通知，但 Signal 自带通知系统不受影响。
salusinarduis查看英文原文
I use GraphineOS and LineageOS without Google Play Services. They are great and are suitable replacements for Apple and Google. - Osmand(FOSS) for maps (supports being fully offline!) - Signal and Discord for messaging (Discord is sandboxed) - Newpipe(FOSS) for Youtube - F-droid(FOSS) for my FOSS appstore - APKmirror for the few non-free apps I need - Libretorrent(FOSS) and VLC(FOSS) for watching movies - Firefox(FOSS) and Vanadium(FOSS) for browser - K9 Mail(FOSS) for email - Infinity(FOSS) for Reddit - Secur(FOSS) for 2FA - Taskkeeper(FOSS) for reminders Almost everything you need is in the F-droid FOSS app repository. It all works, and it works well. You can buy a used Pixel 3a for around $80 on Ebay and have a better experience in every category than iOS, hardware and software. The only limitation is push notifications, which isn't a problem because FOSS apps like Signal bundle their own notification system that does not use Google Play Services. Discord however, does not get push notifications (which I wouldn't want anyway)
支持手机生态隐私问题靠个人无法避免，需要强有力的监管
据我所知，三星预装的默认键盘会收集你输入的内容并与第三方共享/出售。我尽量不在手机上存储或访问个人信息，但到了某个程度，仅仅拥有一部手机就足以严重损害隐私。只有真正有锋利牙齿的强监管才能解决这个问题。
autoexec查看英文原文
Last I checked the default keyboard samsung installs on their phones was collecting what you typed and sharing/selling that data with third parties. I try not to store or access any personal information on my cell phones when i can avoid it, but at a certain point, just having one is enough to seriously compromise your privacy. Strong regulation with real sharp teeth is the only thing that can fix this situation.
补充指出小米回传应用截图是最令人意外的发现
Android 在你切换应用时会对应用截图（用于任务切换界面），这本身是已知行为；但小米/MIUI 会把这些截图回传给公司，这是新信息。
aritmo查看英文原文
Android takes snapshots (screenshots) of apps as soon as you switch to another app. When you view the app list, it already has the last view of each app. But the Xiaomi/MIUI Android sends over those screenshots back to the company is new information.
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